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INTRoDUCING JoHN RAWLS’ CoNCEPT of 
PUBLIC REASoN
In his article, The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited, John Rawls describes the ideal 
relationship that should exist between a 
political liberal society and the many religions 
and secular groups that thrive within it. 
The problem, as stated by Rawls, is that the 
conflicting comprehensive doctrines of the 
existing religious and non-religious sectors 
(which he supposed most are unreasonable) 
within a democratic society pose a potential or 
actual threat to its political stability.
Rawls’ assumption is that, while the 
different comprehensive doctrines may 
not agree with each other and may not 
be necessarily compatible with the liberal 
political conception, yet, at least, they have 
common notion of ‘public reason’ and may 
endorse a constitutional democratic society 
and recognize its public reason.  Basically, this 
position assumes that there are unreasonable 
doctrines that are incompatible with a 
democratic society.  However, they should not 
necessarily go against or stand in the way of 
public reason.  Public reason necessitates that 
comprehensive doctrines must be reasonable 
and to be reasonable, comprehensive doctrines 
do not reject the essentials of a constitutional 
democratic polity.
For citizens (religious and non-religious) 
to have an access to public reason, John Rawls 
proposes that their different comprehensive 
doctrines must be replaced by an idea that 
which is politically reasonable.  He says that 
they need to consider what kinds of reasons 
they may reasonably give one another. He 
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proposes this for the mere fact that these 
citizens cannot reach agreement or even 
approach mutual understanding on the 
basis of their irreconcilable comprehensive 
doctrines. The basic requirement is that a 
reasonable doctrine accepts a constitutional 
regime and its companion idea of legitimate 
law.1  Public reason, as described by John 
Rawls, necessitates a discussion or deliberation 
of what is reasonable done in public but the 
discourse used by those who participate is that 
which can be understood and accepted by all.
The idea of public reason, according to 
Rawls, specifies at the deepest level the basic 
moral and political values that are to determine 
a constitutional democratic government’s 
relation to its citizens and their relation to one 
another.2  As for the content of public reason, 
Rawls says that a citizen engages in public 
reason when he or she deliberates within a 
framework of what he or she sincerely regards 
as the most reasonable political conception of 
justice, a conception that expresses political 
values that others might also reasonably be 
expected to endorse.3  He further adds that 
the content of public reason is given by the 
principles and values of the family of liberal 
political conceptions of justice.  Thus, to 
engage in public reason is to appeal to one 
of these political conceptions when debating 
fundamental political questions.  Rawls believes 
that this requirement still allows different 
religious traditions to introduce into political 
discussions at any time their comprehensive 
doctrines, religious or nonreligious, provided 
that they give properly public reasons to 
support the principles and policies their 
comprehensive doctrine is said to support.4  
Andrew Edgar and Peter Sedgwick 
summarize John Rawls’ idea:
“In the concept of the ‘overlapping 
consensus’ (Rawls, 1987), Rawls tries to 
account for the pluralism of contemporary 
1 John Rawls, Collected  Papers, Ed. Samuel Freeman, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: University Press, 1999), p. 574.
2Rawls, Collected Papers., Section 1.1. 
3Rawls, Collected Papers., Section 2.1
4Rawls, Collected Papers., p. 584.
liberal societies.  Members of society will be 
committed to ‘comprehensive doctrines’ 
that play a large role in constituting their 
self-understanding and sense of identity. 
In a just pluralist society, individuals 
will recognise that not everyone can be 
convinced of the truth of their own doctrine. 
They must accept a degree of ‘reasonable 
disagreement,’ so that their differences 
with others are never resolved.  They 
must be tolerant of other comprehensive 
doctrines.  Thus, in a just society, all 
‘reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ 
will have no common overlapping ground 
of mutual toleration and commitment 
to the liberal principles.  In effect, the 
citizen separates the complex self that is 
constituted through their comprehensive 
doctrines, from their participation as a 
political being in social structures that are 
shared with others, who come from often 
radically divergent communities.”5
An Appraisal of John Rawls’ Concept of 
Public Reason
Quite obviously, John Rawls’ concept of 
public reason has some questionable and 
debatable points. His bias is towards the state 
and his main concern is on how a democratic 
state could survive in a religiously pluralistic 
society.  As such, religious truth claims are being 
subjugated under the pretext of public reason 
in order to protect the interest of the state. 
Roger Trigg writes that clearly Rawls places 
much stress on the notion of the “reasonable,” 
which he distinguishes sharply from that of 
truth.  He further observes that Rawls’ concept 
of public reason that limits the “reasonable” 
within the confines of the political undermines 
and negates reasonability within the realms of 
the religious.6  
Moreover, in Trigg’s analysis, Rawls slides 
so easily from noting the fact of disagreement 
to asserting the absence of a ‘public basis of 
establishing the truth of religious beliefs.’ 
5Peter Edgar, Andrew and Sedgwick, Cultural Theory: The 
Key Thinkers, (Routledge, 2002),  p.193.
6Roger Trigg, Rationality and Religion: Does Faith Need 
Reason?, (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), p.10.
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Trigg believes that Rawls’s idea of a public 
basis is firmly rooted in what can as a matter 
of fact be publicly accepted.   Trigg interprets 
it as sociological and not an epistemological 
concept.  He adds that Rawls refers to ‘publicly 
shared methods of inquiry and forms of 
reasoning,’ as, ‘those methods to be familiar 
from common sense and to include the 
procedures and conclusions of science and 
social thought, when these are well-established 
and not controversial.’7
Trigg understands that these general 
beliefs, that Rawls thinks, reflect ‘the current 
public views in a well-ordered society.’  Trigg 
sees that this notion of ‘well-ordered’ society 
is itself a technical term for Rawls, delineating 
an ideal of affairs.  As Trigg understands it, 
Rawls describes a society in which ‘the publicly 
recognized conception of justice establishes 
a shared point of view from which citizens’ 
claims on society can be adjudicated.’8
Trigg evaluates that in public reason 
“Everything in fact depends on citizens being 
reasonable enough to put aside their particular 
beliefs in order to come to procedural 
agreements, with those they differ, about 
what could count as a public justification.”9 
Trigg adds that Rawls believes that because 
of the great divergences in society, it ought 
to be recognized that the exercise of reason, 
combined with freedom, will never produce 
a consensus.10  He insists that there are 
those who yearn for a settled society where 
people agree on fundamentals, and there are 
those who welcome the fact of diversity and 
difference.  Yet, the problem remains how an 
encouragement of diversity can be properly 
reconciled with a passion for truth.11  Trigg 
points out that Rawls tries to meet this kind 
of problem with his distinction between the 
reasonable and the rational.  He opines that 
for Rawls the idea of reasonable is clearly 
linked with that of fair, social cooperation12 
7Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.67
8Rawls, p.35
9Trigg, Rationality and Religion., p. 11.
10Trigg, Rationality and Religion, p. 12
11Trigg, Rationality and Religion, p. 12.
12Rawls, p.51 
while rational agents pursue their ends both 
individually and collectively without due 
regard to the projects of those with who they 
disagree.
In a place called ‘public world,’ particular 
controversial doctrines have no place, thus 
Rawls says that ‘one must distinguish between 
a public basis of justification generally 
acceptable to citizens on fundamental 
political questions and the many non-public 
bases of justification belonging to the many 
comprehensive doctrines and acceptable only 
to those who affirm them.’13
Using Rawls explanation of what is 
reasonable and rational, it is, thus, obviously 
insinuating that, as Trigg understands, religion 
is an excellent example of a so-called ‘rational’ 
comprehensive doctrine that should not be 
allowed into the public arena.  Because of its 
essentially controversial nature, religion is 
then to be excluded from the public sphere. 
Trigg suggests that toleration should allow 
citizens to pursue any or no religion, but not 
to impose it on others or expect recognition 
in the public sphere.  Trigg understands that 
the tendency all the time is to move religion 
into the private sphere; religion, it seems, is 
a matter for individual decision and should 
not be invoked in deciding public policy. 
According to Trigg, Rawls was more concerned 
about insoluble controversy than religion 
as such.  With the notion of public reason, 
many religious believers will be excluded 
from public debate as their beliefs are ruled in 
private matter.  Trigg adds that the exclusion 
of religious grounds will only leave religious 
believers disgruntled and feeling that their 
voice has not been heard.  They have not even 
been overruled.  They have not been listened 
to. 14
Trigg also argues that Rawls attempt to 
separate politics from metaphysics can seem 
very artificial when one approaches actual 
disputes.  He comments that with it people 
could then agree to cooperate in the public 
13Rawls, p.xix
14Trigg, Rationality and Religion,  p.16
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arena without settling basic issues of truth. 
They could concentrate on procedure and not 
on substance.15  Trigg writes:
“The notion of rationality has been 
privatized and turned over if not to the 
individual, then at least to different 
associations.  It is sundered from the 
public world and hence by implication 
from the world which is objectively real, 
independent of human judgments.  There 
can be no thought of such an objective 
state of affairs to which we all in principle 
have equal access from our different 
vantage points.  In the absence of any 
rational means of arriving at truth that 
can be accepted universally, we have just 
to find some way to enabling people to live 
together even when they cannot agree.”16 
In Trigg’s view, equating the truth with 
public reason is not so much of dealing knotty 
political problems but rather a philosophical 
move which implicitly takes away the right of 
any religion to claim truth for itself.  Moreover, 
associating objectivity with the public world 
may at first appear sensible; however, the 
public world is the world of people and of their 
judgments.  What is acceptable is what is not 
controversial.  What is publicly established 
depends on the mood and preconceptions of 
the so-called ‘public’ at a given time and place. 
Trigg also points out the danger that in this 
process, religious claims maybe subjugated 
or subverted by the fashion of the time.  The 
place of religion in society then becomes 
questionable, not because of its failure to meet 
certain standards of justification, but because 
it runs foul of current prejudices.17  For Trigg, 
the idea of public justification is itself far from 
clear cut.  There will be arguments about 
what counts as a justification, and similar 
differences about what counts as an adequate 
public justification.18  John Rawls does not 
explain in details the processes involved in 
coming up with what he calls public reason; 
15Trigg, Rationality and Religion, p.18
16 Trigg, p.19
17Trigg, Rationality and Religion, p.23
18Trigg, Rationality and Religion, p.24
amidst competing claims and justification 
among different religious traditions, how 
public reason is decided appears uncertain. 
Trigg comments that: 
“There is in the end no way of avoiding 
the complicated and messy arguments 
both about what constitutes truth and 
about which views are true.  It might be 
politically convenient to come to some kind 
of social arrangement which ensures that 
we can live together without having any 
arguments about the things that matter. 
In the end, however, that is an illusion. 
Religion’s place in the society depends on 
assessments of its truth.  It may be tempting 
to imagine that we can have a sanitized 
form of reason for the public world while 
still making rational judgments within 
the cocoons of our private lives.  Objective 
truth and the public world cannot finally 
part company.  If we want to claim truth 
for our beliefs, they must be able to pass 
scrutiny on the public stage.  If religion 
cannot claim truth, it can have no genuine 
public role to play.” 19
Here, it is clear that theoretically, John 
Rawls’ idea of public reason presents some 
ambiguous and problematic issues especially 
on the issue of religious freedom and how the 
different religious traditions are supposed 
to maintain their sacred beliefs while at the 
same time promote the political, social and 
economic interest of the state.  John Rawls have 
not succeeded in explaining the intricacies 
involved in this kind of state - religion 
relationship in the context of a democratic 
society. Indeed, equating “reasonable” and 
generally “acceptable” with that which is 
primarily public and political will undermine 
the significant role that religion can play in the 
society.  As it appears, John Rawls’ idea of public 
reason is mainly designed for the protection of 
the state at the expense of religion.
Let me now proceed to verify John Rawls’ 
idea of public reason in two concrete and 
practical situations that are quite prevalent 
19Trigg, Rationality and Religion, p. 27
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in a democratic society.  Here, I would like 
to analyze how John Rawls’ concept of public 
reason works in two areas, namely: Separation 
of Church and State; and Freedom of Assembly 
which are considered inalienable religious 
rights inherent in a democratic and liberal 
society.
Separation of the Church and the State
Basically, in a democratic society, the 
State plays a minute but significant role in 
regulating and controlling religious activities, 
behavior and morality.  This is due to the 
guiding principle of “separation of the Church 
and the State” that directs the operations of 
both bodies.  Meaning, the Church can operate, 
manage and control its activities without 
intervention from the State.  The State cannot 
dip its hand on how the Church is running its 
affair, in the same manner that the Church 
cannot intervene in how the State is running 
its affair.  
This is expressed in essence in the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
which was in a great measure influenced 
by Protestant churches.  Their view of soul 
freedom and separation of the church and state 
is seen in their earliest known confessions of 
faith, and their practice as a denomination has 
never parted company with their doctrine. 
There has never been a time in their history, 
so far, as that history is known to us, where 
as a corporate people they wavered in their 
doctrine of Free Church in a free state.  Even 
those who, through their misguided zeal for a 
particular cause, have placed this principle in 
jeopardy hold tenaciously to this principle.20
The portion of the First Amendment 
reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.”  One thing is quite clear.  This 
amendment prohibits an established church 
in the United States. No religious group is to 
be designated as the state church, such as the 
Anglicans in England and the Presbyterians in 
20E. Y. Hobbs, Herschel H. and Mullins, The Axioms of 
Religion, (Broadman Press, Nashville, Tennessee, 1978).
Scotland.  This amendment also forbids laws 
that prohibit the free exercise of religion, 
whether it be Christianity, Judaism, Islam, 
Buddhism, Animism, or whatever.  No person 
can be forced by law to espouse any religion 
or to profess faith in deity.  This amendment 
recognizes the competency of the soul in 
religion, the right of direct access to God, and 
the freedom of choice with respect to religion. 
Here, “it is an accepted axiom by all Americans 
that the civil power ought to be not only neutral 
and impartial as between entirely different forms 
of faith, but ought to leave these matters on one 
side, regarding them no more than they regard the 
artistic or literary pursuits of its citizens.” 21
In short, the entire contents of the axiom 
are summed up in the statement that the state 
has no ecclesiastical function and the church 
no civic function.  The First Amendment, 
which expresses the heart of this axiom, says 
that the state should not control the church 
and the church should not control the state. 
It was born out of the bitter experience of 
Europe where first one and then the other of 
these bodies sought to control or did control 
the other.22
However, in a democratic society, the 
Church and the State are pictured as the rails of 
a railroad track where the train travels towards 
its destination.  Though they are separated 
from each other, they are fastened on unseen 
crossties of cooperation, complementing and 
supplementing each other’s initiatives in a 
grand road map for national progress.  Such 
is the role of the church and the state in a 
democratic society.  These roles, however, are 
not clearly defined, specified and enforced.  But 
what is clear is that, religious interests are well 
protected and different religious traditions 
are not pressured to convert their beliefs into 
something publicly reasonable in order to 
promote the affairs and interests of the state. 
In this context therefore, the idea of public 
reason appears irrelevant and unnecessary. 
What I mean is that, in a democratic society 
21Hobbs, The Axioms of Religion.
22Hobbs, The Axioms of Religion. 
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where separation of church and state is well 
entrenched and established, the notion of 
public reason is simply irrelevant.
There are instances and cases, however, 
where the Government, in spite of the absence 
of laws and/or rules and regulations, assert 
and affirm its supreme power in regulating 
and controlling religious activities, behavior 
and morality.  This in a sense destroys the 
spirit of democracy that provides for religious 
freedom and individual liberty.  In Indonesia, 
this case of the government trying to impose 
its power over religion to protect its political 
and economic interest was evident during 
Suharto’s New Order Government when 
religious movements perceived to be “threats” 
to the state’s political power were suppressed. 
On the other hand, the presence of 
a dominant religion may also jeopardize 
democratic processes in terms of allowing 
minority voices to be heard in public.  In this 
case one religion may regulate, control, and 
dictate government policies and activities. 
There is always what we call, the “tyranny of 
the majority” over and against the minority. 
Religious nationalism which tends to promote 
the supremacy of one religion over the others 
is one common problem that we can see even 
in so-called democratic countries like India, 
Indonesia and the Philippines.  The idea of 
public reason that promotes equal access and 
participation by different religious groups 
and traditions may not work effectively in 
this particular context.  Even in a democratic 
society, the possibility of either the state or 
religion imposing their political will over the 
other can not be ruled out.  In this case, both 
the state and religion operate not in the context 
of public reason but on what is perceived to be 
“reasonable” in their own terms.  
freedom of Assembly
One of the basic rights provided in a 
democratic society is the Freedom of Assembly. 
That means, groups and individuals (religious, 
civic or secular) have the right to assemble and 
decide for themselves what they believe is in 
accordance with their beliefs and conviction 
concerning issues of morality and state action. 
In the Philippines, this was made evident 
during the most celebrated EDSA Revolution 
in 1986 when church people, together with 
various civic and cause-oriented groups 
marched along the streets calling for the end 
of the Marcos dictatorship.
At the height of his administration, 
Marcos declared Martial Law in 1972 by using 
fabricated evidences and faking events that 
threat national security.  The Congress was 
dissolved, thus suspending democratic rule. 
Freedom of expression was stifled, press 
freedom was denied.  Those who expressed 
dissenting opinion were placed in the stockade 
and jailed.  Among those were the former 
Senators Benigno Aquino, Jovito Salonga and 
Heherson Alvarez, Sergio Osmeña III, and 
Congressman Satur Ocampo, to name a few.
For two decades, this was going on and 
the government was monitoring religious 
activities and even sermons.  However, the 
Filipino people’s love of freedom prompted 
some civil society groups, including religious 
organizations to undertake anti-government 
initiatives. Rallies and demonstrations were 
held, which the dictator’s security forces 
always dispersed resulting to mass arrest and 
death of several brilliant opposition leaders. 
However, the church called on the faithful to 
support the cause of restoring democracy by 
forming people barricades around the camp to 
prevent the dictator’s forces from making an 
attack and finally, after a long stand off, the 
Marcos regime had collapsed.  
The above incident is just one of the many 
cases where religious freedom turned the tide 
against government power of regulating and 
controlling religious activities. But the point is, 
in this particular context, religion takes upon 
itself the crucial decision of turning against a 
corrupt and autocratic regime based on what 
it perceived to be “just” and “reasonable.” 
What is reasonable in this case is not dictated 
by so-called “public reason” but primarily by 
certain religious belief and conviction.  Thus, 
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in this case, Trigg’s argument against Rawls’ 
confinement of “reasonable” to public reason 
makes a lot of sense.  Here, we see that religious 
comprehensive doctrines can in many ways be 
reasonable and vital for significant societal 
change.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown the problems 
and inadequacies of John Rawls’ idea of public 
reason not only in the theoretical sense but 
also in practical and concrete situations 
obtaining in a democratic society.  Here, we see 
that even if the problem of religious diversity 
is “solved” in political theory, as John Rawls 
suggests, it has hardly been resolved in actual 
political and civic practice.  Religious diversity 
remains a problem for both political practice 
and religious thought.
Who needs reason when faced with actual 
dispute as Trigg asks?  Who pauses and thinks of 
“reasonable” in times of political and religious 
turmoil or upheavals?  The idea of reasonability 
can be so subjective and can hardly be thought 
of objectively either from the political or 
religious perspective. What is reasonable 
therefore should not be confined within the 
limits of either the political or the religious, 
but must be viewed in a more comprehensive 
manner.  Both the state and religion should 
find better ways of relating to each other in a 
more effective way, not trying to compete and 
outdo one another but to collaborate for the 
well-being of the people and society.
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